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ABSTRACT
The utility of on-orbit servicing of
spacecraft has been demonstrated by NASA
several times using shuttle-based astronaut
EVA. There has been interest in utilizing
on-orbit servicing for military space
systems as well. This interest has been
driven by the increasing reliance of all
branches of the military upon space-based
assets, the growing numbers, complexity, and
cost of those assets, and a desire to
normalize support policies for space-based
operations.
Many military satellites are placed in
orbits which are unduly hostile for
astronaut operations and/or cannot be
reached by the shuttle. In addition, some
of the projected tasks may involve hazardous
operations. This has led to a focus on
robotic systems, instead of astronauts, for
the basis of projected servicing systems.
This paper describes studies and activities
which will hopefully lead to on-orbit
servicing being one of the tools available
to military space systems designers and
operators. The utility of various forms of
servicing has been evaluated for present and
projected systems, critical technologies
have been identified, and strategies for the
development and insertion of this technology
into operational systems have been
developed.
Many of the projected plans have been
adversely affected by budgetary restrictions
and evolving architectures, but the
fundamental benefits and requirements are
well understood. A method of introducing
servicing capabilities in a manner which has
a low impact on the system designer and does
not require the prior development of an
expensive infrastructure is discussed. This
can potentially lead to an evolutionary
implementation of the full technology.
i. HISTORY OF SPACE-BASED SERVICING
Space-based systems are very valuable for
many diverse applications. They are also
very expensive to build and to place into
orbit. Although satellites are designed to
high standards and extensively tested on the
ground, they have suffered from the range
and rate of anomalies to be expected fro
such complex systems.
For the first 15 years of space activity,
troubled systems could be salvaged only by
creative reprogramming from the ground. For
example, a Tracking and Data Relay Satellite
(TDRSS) was raised into a useful orbit using
its attitude control thrusters following a
problem with the IUS. If such a work-around
could not be achieved, there was no
alternative but to launch a replacement
system.
Once man began gaining regular access to
space, the alternative of direct action on
the problems became possible. There have
been a number of space missions which have
been saved by corrective actions taken by
astronauts performing Extra Vehicular
Activities (EVA). The first of these was
on the initial deployment of Skylab in 1973
when repairs were made to the solar panels
and thermal shield which had been damaged
during launch. Had it not been for this
manual improvisation, the vehicle would have
been unusable.
In 1984, an EVA repair mission from the
shuttle replaced a failed attitude control
module on the Solar-Max satellite and
restored that vehicle and its payload to
full operational status. An additional 6
years of valuable data was obtained as a
result of this repair. There were plans to
revisit this satellite in 1990 for a second
servicing mission to recover it before re-
entry, but the only available flight
opportunity was pre-empted by the recovery
of the Long Duration Exposure Facility.
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A pair of communication satellites, Palapa
and Westar, were stranded in low earth orbit
due to failures in their boost propulsion
systems. Although these satellites were not
originally designed with provisions for
orbital handling, an on-orbit recovery
mission was carried out from the shuttle in
1985. The spacecraft were recovered by
astronaut EVA operations, refurbished, and
later relaunched.
The most recent example of a space mission
being saved by on-orbit action is the
deployment of the Gamma Ray Observatory
(GRO) on STS-37. After the high-gain
antenna failed to deploy, the crew performed
an EVA which successfully freed a stuck boom
by using a crank designed for ground
operations. Without this corrective action,
the $650 million spacecraft would have been
unable to return useful data to earth.
The Soviets have also salvaged several
missions by on-orbit repairs of their
Salyut/MIR space stations. Problems they
have corrected by EVA range from the release
of jammed mechanisms to the replacement of
portions of a fluid system, which involved
cutting and welding tubing.
2. MILITARY INTEREST IN SPACE SERVICING
These demonstrations created an interest
within the Department of Defense in the
benefits of space servicing operations. The
use of space-based systems has become an
integrated part of military doctrine, and
the number, complexity, and expense of these
systems is projected to increase in the
future. This growing military reliance upon
space requires that the systems meet the
required operational availability and be
fielded and operated within budgetary
constraints. It was recognized that
extending the service life of space-based
assets by correcting conditions which would
otherwise terminate the mission could reduce
the life cycle costs and increase the
operational utility of military systems.
of the two agencies. NASA has developed a
satellite servicing methodology and
technology based upon astronauts performing
EVA operations from the shuttle orbiter or,
in future years, from the Space Station.
As in the examples above, these operations
take place in relatively low altitude earth
orbits that can be reached by the shuttle
orbiter.
Most of the prospective DoD candidates for
servicing would be located in high altitude
or high inclination orbits which could not
be reached by the shuttle. In addition to
military space assets being difficult to
reach, many of them are located in
environments are hazardous to astronaut
operations, such as the radiation belts.
It is also recognized that performing an EVA
is inherently a high risk operation. If
space-based servicing were to be
incorporated as an operational tool, a
potentially large number of remote
operations might be required. It is prudent
to reduce the potential risk to human life
if a suitable alternative can be made
available.
Another important difference between NASA
and DoD requirements is the timeliness of
response to problems. Most NASA systems are
scientific satellites. The interruption of
their data is an inconvenience that can
generally be recovered from by later
observation time. However, the critical
defence missions of military satellites
dictate that these systems be restored to
full operational availability as quickly as
possible after an anomaly. This may require
timelines which are incompatible with the
time required to schedule and launch a
manned response but which can be met by a
dedicated launch of a small unmanned system.
These requirements have led the DoD to
emphasize a robotic approach utilizing
expendable launch vehicles for the servicing
of space assets rather than the astronaut
EVA approach developed by NASA.
Military interest in space-servicir_g
techniques was given a major stimulus by the
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The
early SDI architectures featured large
constellations of space-based weapons and
surveillance systems. The potential
supportability requirements associated with
large numbers of complex and expensive
satellites were identified as critical
issues in the development of these systems.
3. DIVERGENCE OF DOD AND NASA REQUIREMENTS
Although DoD is following NASA's lead into
orbital servicing and wishes to fully
leverage NASA's experience and technology
base in this area, there are significant
differences between the needs and interests
4. FAILURE MODES OF SPACE SYSTEMS
The requirements definition for a space-
based servicing system begins with an
examination of situations for which
servicing might be an appropriate response.
These failure modes can be classified into
several broad categories. The first of
these catagories is the failure of a
component which results in the partial or
complete loss of system functionality.
These failures will almost always be of a
random nature, since almost the entire
mission life falls within the regime
described by the flat or random failure
region of a standard "bathtub shaped"
reliability curve, as shown in Figure I.
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There will be a relatively high rate of
"infant mortality" early in the mission.
With a few minor exceptions, the increase
in failure rate associated with the wear out
portion of the reliability curve is never
reached.
Since these failures can occur at any time
(although concentrated early in the mission)
and often without warning, they are the most
stressing in the time required for a
response.
The second category is that of degradation
in the performance of a component or
subsystem. This type of failure has the
effect of a gradual reduction in the
performance margin of a system, sometimes
reaching a threshold at which system
functionality is lost. This usually gives
ample time to plan a response, especially
in cases where the rate of degradation can
be well characterized. An example is
degradation of solar cells due to radiation
damage.
A third life-limiting category is depletion
of consumables. It is somewhat similar to
degradation in that it is a time- or cycle-
dependent phenomena, but fundamentally
different on that the performance of the
system is not affected until the consumab!@
is depleted, at which time functionality is
lost. Consumption of fuel in a propulsion
system is a typical example.
Another category where servicing might be
beneficial is that of a system which has not
failed, but has become outmoded. A
capability of inserting upgraded technology
into the basic system could extend the
spacecraft's useful life,enhance its mission
capabilities and lower life cycle cost.
5. RESPONSES TO FAILURE MODES
There are three general types of responses
available to life limiting issues or failure
modes. The first of these is to change the
design. If a mission is limited by
depletion of a consumable, adding a larger
amount of that consumable to the original
design is more efficient than supplying more
once the system is on station, provided that
the additional mass is within the available
launch capacity. Additional margin can be
built into systems which suffer from
degradation, with the same proviso on weight
limitations. Reliability of complex systems
can be improved by providing both component
level and subsystem level redundancy.
However, there is a limit to the level of
redundancy which can be provided before the
potential failures arising from the
increased complexity outweigh the benefits.
Launch weight limitations can be a factor
here as well.
A more sophisticated design change would be
to change the function. Failure modes such
as those associated with mechanical
mechanisms can be designed out of the system
or alternative approaches can be used for
the overall system architecture. A subtle
variant is to reconfigure the system by
telemetry to "work around" anomalies.
These design approaches are normally used
to maximize service life, and will continue
to be the most appropriate first response
for failure modes which can be clearly
identified.
However, experience has shown that good
design practice alone cannot eliminate on-
orbit failures. The classical response to
such failures is to abandon and replace the
failed, degraded, or obsolete asset. This
willll continue to be the most appropriate
response in some cases.
The emerging alternative to abandonment of
failed assets is on-orbit servicing. This
response has been demonstrated on an ad-hoc
basis on systems which were not originally
designed for servicing, but offers the
greatest promise if it is a basic design
feature of the system. Servicing is not a
universal panacea, but merely another tool
which the system designer can exploit to
achieve the most responsive concept. The
economic viability of servicing is dependent
upon the cost, weight, and inherent
reliability of the satellite, launch costs,
and the nature of the failure. It must be
recognized that designing for servicing is
an additional requirement which can conflict
with other design requirements and may
entail cost and mass penalties. However,
these penalties may be offset by
producibility and testing benefits as well
the benefits gained by servicing.
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In each case, the choice of whether the
potentially mission limiting feature should
be responded to by design changes or by
operational servicing is a question to be
decided on the basis of lowest cost, with
the answer tempered by technical
capabilities. For military systems,
operational needs and availability will also
be a strong consideration and may outweigh
other factors. In many cases the optimum
solution will utilize both approaches, with
the system designed to provide the maximum
possible life and servicing providing an
extension in capability beyond tha_
constrained by engineering or initial launch
weight.
6. KEY SERVICING TECHNOLOGIES
Our examination of the specific operations
required to perform on-orbit servicing
identified the technologies which must b< _
developed to achieve this capability. We
found these to be relatively few and well
within current engineering practice. The
most critical issue appears to be that of
designing the systems for servicing.
As we evaluated the details of how to
perform servicing of failed or degraded
components it became apparent that current
military design practice is not compatible
with robotic on-orbit servicing. Systems
are assembled by building outward from a
tightly packed interior. Components are
integrated on equipment platforms and are
thus largely inaccessible. It is pointless
to debate the levels of robotic technology
required when these tasks could not be
performed even by an astronaut with a
complete tool kit.
greater experience base for each hardware
item would also allow the ultimate
reliability rates to be improved over what
they would be if a specific item were
developed for each application. This module
standardization and mass production also
enhances the availability of production line
spares. These spares and the ease of repair
on the 0RU level will reduce production
delays on the system level.
The synergistic relationship between
modularity and serviceability recalls the
experience of the Solar Max. The on-orbit
repair which returned it to service was
possible not because the MMS spacecraft had
been designed to be serviceable but because
it was designed to achieve the production
and assembly benefits of modularity. The
repair was an unanticipated benefit of the
resultant accessibility.
Our implementation analysis identified
several technologies which are either
enabling or enhancing to remote servicing
missions. Three of these were judged to be
key in that they must be demonstrated in
order for on-orbit to be fully accepted as
an operational concept. These are
autonomous rendezvous and docking, robotic
ORU replacement, and fluid transfer.
It is possible to fly a rendezvous and
docking mission entirely under remote
piloted control. However, an autonomous
system would significantly reduce
operational support requirements and costs
as well as provide higher reliability and
more efficient propellant usage. This
technique is regularly used by the USSR in
supplying their space station but has not
yet been demonstrated by the US.
The full benefits of on-orbit servicing can
be achieved only if the spacecraft to be
serviced is designed from its very inception
with a large percentage of its systems
modular and accessible. Robotic removal of
these modules should also be a design
consideration. This goal is best
implemented by a spacecraft architecture
featuring standard fittings, interfaces, and
docking locations with the orbital
replacement units (ORUs) located on an
external frame where they are accessible.
An important consequence of this modular
architecture is that it implies a radically
new manufacturing, test, and assembly flow.
Modules can be built up in parallel and
tested independently by plugging into
spacecraft bus simulators. Errors could be
detected and corrected at a lower level with
less impact than in the traditional buildup
of equipment platforms into spacecraft.
The use of standard subsystem 0RUs across
several programs would enable an economy of
scale to be achieve which could
substantially reduce unit costs. The
The location of many DoD assets in orbits
with high radiation fluxes or other hazards
makes it desirable to perform servicing
robotically. Robotic replacement of ORUs
by simple, well defined motion can be
enabled by a standardization of docking
locations and fittings. This can eliminate
the requirement for highly capable robots
with advanced sensing, manipulative, and
cognitive capabilities. The man-in-the loop
requirements will be minimized by the
definition of the locations and motions to
be executed. This autonomy reduces the
criticality of the time delay in the
feedback loop which has been seen as a limit
to tele-operations.
There is a trade-off between the degree of
structure provided in the environment and
the level of robotic technology required.
It appears best to begin with a simple,
structured system which has a growth path
to higher complexity. The servicing robot
would operate in the supervised autonomy
mode, carrying out a series of pre-
programmed "macro" instructions, pausing
between each operation for verification and
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authority to proceed. Manual override and
tele-robotic operation would be available
for dealing with unanticipated situations.
It is important to design the robot to fail
in a safe and recoverable mode and not
induce failures on either the servicer or
the spacecraft being serviced.
The reduction of robotic operations to
simple, well defined motions allows the
robotic servicing subsystem to be very
simple. This is a very important concept
because this simplicity allows the robotic
device to achieve a high level of
reliability. On-orbit servicing can be
economically viable only if the failure
rates of the support system are extremely
low. This simplicity also allows the
robotic servicer to be developed with near-
term technologies.
The connectors and procedures for on-orbit
fluid transfer comprise the third key
technology which must be demonstrated. The
replenishment of propellants or other fluids
was identified as one of the prime
candidates for on-orbit servicing. DoD has
a near term interest in hydrazine for
refuelling a variety of spacecraft in both
low and high altitude orbits, with a longer
term interest in liquid cryogens for
propulsion or space-based weapons. NASA is
interest is in supplying superfluid helium
to scientific satellites such as the Space
Infrared Telescope Facility (SERTF).
Since refuelling can be implemented with
minimal impact upon the spacecraft
architecture, its potential benefits have
been examined in several government
sponsored studies. The most recent of these
was performed for Air Force Space Systems
Division Long Range Planning and Development
Office. The study found two classes of
satellites which could benefit from on-orbit
refuelling. These were satellites in low
earth orbit which had a basic propulsion
requirement for drag makeup, and those in
geo-synchronous orbit which have a base
requirement for station-keeping. In both
cases, the benefits of refuelling were
derived more from the operationa]
flexibility of greater maneuver capability
than by addressing the basic propulsion
requirement.
Analysis usually shows that the most cost-
effective method of extending propulsion
lifetime of satellites is to increase the
size of the original fuel tanks, up to the
limit imposed by booster capacity. If the
remainder of the payload is of sufficiently
high reliability and value, it can even pay
to move to the next larger class of booster.
The problem of matching the fuel capacity
to the rest of the system lies in the nature
of the failure rates of the rest of the
system. The design life of the system,
which is normally used for sizing of
subsystems, is not a hard limit unless it
is set by exhaustion of a consumable. It
is not even marked by a cluster of expected
failures unless system lifetime is dominated
by wearout failures. System lifetime is
usually determined by random failures which
occur at an even rate once the infant
mortality period is passed. Thus the design
life is a statistical concept denoting the
point at which the predicted availability
falls below the system allocation.
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The probability that a space system will be
operating satisfactorily follows the pattern
shown in Figure 2. There is an immediate
drop in reliability due to the chance of
failure during launch and deployment. The
availability then decreases with time during
the early infant mortality period, with the
rate of failure decreasing as the random
failure region is reached. The failure rate
increases again if the wearout region is
reached. However, depletion of a consumable
such as fuel will usually terminate system
operation before wearout is reached. A
nominal design life point is shown.
It is this statistical basis of the random
failures that provides an economic incentive
for refuelling. There will be systems which
will reach the nominal design life without
failure. If they are sufficiently far from
a wearout mode limit they will be no more
likely to fail during the next x years than
they were during the first x years.
Therefore, there is additional useful life
which could be obtained by refuelling. The
statistical chance that there might also be
an unrecoverable failure early in the
mission makes it unprofitable to oversize
the fuel tanks to the point of requiring a
larger booster.
The economics and utility of refuelling can
thus be seen to be justified primarily on
a contingency basis. It is those off-
nominal cases where the system is required
to make unanticipated maneuvers, or when the
system continues to operate successfully
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beyond the nominal design lifetime that
benefit from the capability to provide
additional fluids in orbit. These benefits
can be potentially large in relation to the
costs required to achieve them.
7. REQUIRED TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATIONS
Spacecraft fluids can be classified by
physical properties and hardware technology
requirements into five general categories.
Gases
Monopropellants (includes water)
Bipropellants
Superfluid Helium
All Other Cryogens
There is nothing unique to the space
environment which affects gas transfer, so
its technology is well in hand. Supply and
handling systems for the other four
categories have each been given some
development attention, and vary to the
degree of technical maturity.
The on-orbit transfer of hydrazine was
demonstrated by an experiment in the shuttle
payload bay in 1984. Hydrazine was
transferred from one tank to another after
a valve was opened by an astronaut. This
resolved many of the issues associated with
low-gravity fluid transfer, including
adiabatic recompression. The Storable Fluid
Management Experiment further resolved
micro-gravity fluid handling issues by
observing the behavior of water in a
transparent tank in the shuttle mid-deck in
1985. There are still some issues to
further explored, such as mass gauging and
robotic operation of "zero-leak" connectors
under micro-gravity conditions. However,
the physics is well understood and only a
demonstration is required.
NASA is current developing an on-orbit
demonstration of superfluid helium transfer
in the SHOOT (Superfluid Helium On Orbit
Transfer) experiment. This will resolve
many of the additional technical issues
peculiar to this fluid such as the fluid
transfer process and mechanisms, tank chill-
down and venting operations in micro-
gravity, and verification of thermal models
for heat transfer within the tank due to
mixing.
A substantial amount of hardware supportive
of on-orbit fluid transfer has been built
and tested on the ground. Several prototype
valves and connectors suitable for robotic
operation have been developed under contract
to NASA-JSC. An automatic fluid interface
system (AFIS) which could hold these valves
and act as a coupler between the servicer
and target spacecraft has been built under
contract to NASA-MSFC.
Much of the remaining technical development
required for an on-orbit fluid transfer
system can be performed as part of an
experiment within the shuttle payload bay.
However, true confidence on the part of
potential users will not be obtained until
mating and fluid transfer is demonstrated
on free-flying satellites.
There is very little technology work
required for an autonomous rendezvous and
docking system, as all the requisite
technologies exist as components. What
remains to be done is the system integration
and demonstration. The control system
operation can be partially verified by a
test and evaluation program which begins
with software simulation and evolves into
hardware-in-the-loop simulations on air-
bearing tables. However, the final full-up
demonstration of responses in all six
dynamic dimensions must be achieved as a
free-flying space experiment. Although
preliminary development of the sensor
systems can be done on ground test ranges,
a space flight experiment will be required
to verify performance at operational ranges
against realistic backgrounds.
The development and demonstration
requirements for the robotic manipulator
system parallel those for the docking
control system. The control loops and end
effector operation can largely be
demonstrated on the ground in all aspects
except those affected by micro-gravity.
Manipulator arm dynamic response in a micro-
gravity environment is important only for
large, light assemblies such as those being
developed for the Flight Telerobotic
Servicer (FTS). A simpler, more compact
manipulator as described above might have
enough stiffness to be verified in ground
tests. The arm dynamics can be assessed as
part Of an attached shuttle payload
experiment.
The major dynamics issue which can be
resolved only through a free-flight
experiment is the cross-coupling between the
manipulator dynamics and the control systems
of the servicer and target spacecraft.
In addition to the extensive component
development which has been carried out in
each of the core enabling technology areas,
there have been several attempts to
integrate them into a full system
demonstration. The most ambitious was the
Satellite Servicer System Flight
Demonstration which was jointly sponsored
by NASA and DoD. This program was to have
drawn upon the hardware base described above
as well as the Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle
(OMV) and FTS programs to produce a free
flying orbital demonstration of the three
critical servicing technologies. Budgetary
constraints at the sponsoring agencies led
to its cancellation just as the contractors
were about to begin design definition work.
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Air Force Space Systems Division recently
sponsored a concept study addressing
rendezvous, docking, and refuelling on a
smaller scale using an expendable vehicle.
This study was carried out by NASA-Jet
Propulsion Laboratory. Various means of
carrying this concept forth to a flight
demonstration are under consideration. One
promising approach might be to use the SPAS
hardware owned by SDIO which has already
flown twice and will be reused for several
additional experiment payloads.
We cannot ignore the fact that other nations
have been active in this area, and the first
flight demonstration may be performed by
either the Japanese or Europeans. In
particular, the Japanese ETS-7 spacecraft
appears to have this as its goal. The ETS-
7 will demonstrate the 3 key technologies
described earlier.
8. IMPLEMENTATION OF SERVICING
One of the problems which must be addressed
in order to obtain the benefits of on-orbit
servicing is how this technology might be
inserted into operational systems. There
is a very long lead time in the development
of new series of spacecraft and there is an
understandable reluctance to make provisions
for a capability which has not been fully
integrated and demonstrated. Likewise, it
is difficult to develop a support
infrastructure in the absence of established
users.
An effective way to work out of this chicken
and egg impasse might be to introduce
servicing capabilities on a contingency
basis. For example, a grappling fixture
could be incorporated into a spacecraft
design at minimal cost and mass penalty.
There may not be plans to use this in the
original operational concept, but it might
enable some corrective action to be taken
later in the case of unanticipated events,
as has occurred so often in the past.
Likewise, the capability for on-orbit
refuelling could be provided at relatively
low cost to the user. A fill valve is
normally provided in spacecraft propulsion
systems to allow the satellite to be fuelled
shortly before launch. Making this valve
compatible with robotic operations and
allowing accessibility to it would enable
on-orbit refuelling to take place at some
future time, should the need arise and a
servicing system be developed.
These contingency provisions can be
justified by the extremely high ratio of the
benefits which might be achieved, if they
were ever to be needed, to the relatively
modest costs of incorporating them as
standard spacecraft design features.
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